The United States and Turkey's Path to Europe: Hands Across the Table by Armağan Emre Çakir

Author:Armağan Emre Çakir [Çakir, Armağan Emre]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, European, Political Science, World, General
ISBN: 9781317286424
Google: 9kxACwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 28409852
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2015-12-22T00:00:00+00:00

A month later, when he visited Turkey, in his address to the Turkish Parliament, ‘Greek–Turkish relations’ was one of the topics he covered.277 He used this theme even in the speech he delivered on the occasion of his reception of the International Charlemagne Prize in Aachen, Germany on 2 June 2000:

I applaud the EU’s decision to treat Turkey as a real candidate for membership. I hope both Turkey and the EU will take the next steps. It will be good for Turkey, good for Southeast Europe; good for more rapid reconciliation between Greece and Turkey and the resolution of Cyprus, and good for the entire world, which is still too divided over religious differences.278

The chess game between Turks and Greeks was in a stalemate where both parties had been stuck for years in such problems as Cyprus or the continental shelf in the Aegean. A corollary to this prolonged antagonism was the delay in Turkey’s integration with Europe. To Holbrooke, Cyprus seemed to be the key piece to break the stalemate. He moved this piece ‘towards Europe’ and left Turks two options: either cooperate for a solution, or watch the island become an EU member without the Turkish Cypriots. The resentment Turks felt from this imposition made it difficult for them to appreciate

1 that it was thanks to this move that the Greek veto against Turkey’s CU and candidacy could be lifted;

2 that, had Turks not insisted on the recognition of the TRNC as a party in the accession process of Cyprus, which was a hope for the impossible given the status of the TRNC in international law and the sensitivity of the Greeks in the issue, Cypriot Turks would not have been excluded;

3 that although the Cyprus move was risky, for Clinton the island was not a simple pawn to be sacrificed. He was unhappy with accession of Cyprus to the EU without the Turkish Cypriots. Towards the end of his term, he was still considering the Cyprus issue unresolved and was determined to work on it after his presidency until the issue was solved to everyone’s satisfaction;

4 that Clinton’s ultimate aim in his FP regarding this region, his checkmate on the Eurasian chessboard, would be Turkey’s EU membership; and

5 that the accession of a divided Cyprus to the EU was undesirable not only for Turkey but also for Italy, Germany, France, and Belgium.279 With the Cyprus move, Clinton was taking the risk of disturbing his European friends.

Most of these points can be identified in Clinton’s unperturbed reply to the provocative pro-Greek question of a journalist:

Q: Mr. President, despite your personal involvement for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement over the Aegean and Cyprus, Ankara has become more aggressive against the territorial integrity of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus in the last days. May we have your comments?

THE PRESIDENT: […] I can say that one of the relatively small number of real disappointments I have after eight years of working in the foreign policy field is that I have not made more progress in helping to resolve the

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